This study examines the self-reported ethics of both current and future advertising practitioners, and compares their responses to four scenarios and 17 statements on advertising ethics. Stepwise discriminant analysis was used to determine the extent to which both groups applied the classical ethical theory of deontology to the scenarios and statements. Results indicate significant differences between both groups. For example, current advertising practitioners are significantly less likely than future practitioners to apply deontology to decision making. The implications of these results (...) are discussed and suggestions for future research are outlined. (shrink)

W. V. Quine calls some general methods of science maxims: general defeasible principles that call on us to approximate, maximize, or minimize a state and that are interpreted and weighed in context-sensitive ways. On my reading, his empiricism asks us to maximize accepting overall theories empirically equivalent to ours but to minimize accepting sentences that both do not affect the empirical content of our overall theory and do not simplify our overall theory. His naturalism asks us to maximize accepting sentences (...) that are solely supported by standards that support our best current scientific theory. Drawing on the Quine archive at Houghton Library at Harvard, I support and apply these interpretations by investigating his rapidly evolving later work on empirical content and empirical equivalence, including some of his views on translation in this later work and his vacillation between what he calls the ecumenical and sectarian attitudes. (shrink)

W.V. Quine is a well-known proponent of naturalism, the view on which reality is described only in science. He is also well-known for arguing that our current scientific theories commit us to the existence of abstract objects. It is tempting to believe that the naturalistic philosopher should think scientists outside of philosophy are in the best position to assess the merits of revising our current commitment to abstract objects. But Quine rejects this deferential view. On the reading of Quine’s philosophical (...) methodology that I defend in this paper, the naturalistic philosopher not only may assess the merits of revising the commitments of our scientific theories, but also will recommend we make such revisions if doing so simplifies and clarifies our science. To develop my reading, I will examine John Burgess and Gideon Rosen’s naturalism in ontology that includes the deferential view Quine rejects. By explaining how Quine’s naturalism differs from the anti-revisionist, deferential naturalism in philosophy of mathematics that Burgess and Rosen advance, I seek to clarify and advance contemporary debates on naturalism. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article:The Art of Biblical Poetry. By Robert AlterThe‐ Demise of the Devil: Magic and the Demonic in Luke's Writings. By Susan R. CarrettEchoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul. By Richard B. HaysJesus and Postmodernism. By James BreechThe Genesis of Doctrine: A Study in the Foundations of Doctrinal Criticism. By Alister E. McGrathOrdination Rites of the Ancient Churches, East and West. By Paul BradshawMystagogy: A Theology of Liturgy in the Patristic Age. By Enrico MazzaLiberation (...) Theology: A Documentary Histoty. Edited by Alfred T. HennellyThe Gospel in a Pluralist Society. By Lesslie NewbiginThe Sacred in Life and Art. By Philip SherrardThe Ideology of the Aesthetic. By Terry EagletonThe Justification of Science and the Rationality of Religious Belief. By Michael BannerReturn to Reason. By James Kelly ClarkThe Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrares, Together with Notes of Schelling's Berlin Lectures. Edited by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong‘For Self‐Examination’and‘Judge for Yourself’. Edited by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. HongSimone Weil; Utopian Pessimist. By David McLcllanThe Making of Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick. Edited by Rowan WilliamsThe Apostolic Fathers. By Simon TugwellChristian Spirituality: Post‐Reformation and Modern. Edited by Louis Dupré and Don E. SaliersThe Ignatian Personality of Gerard Manley Hopkins. By David Anthony DownesMissionaries Go Home? A Sociological Interpretation of an African Response to Christian Missions. By E. M. UkaChristian‐Nationalism and the Rise of the Afrikaner Broederbond in South AfricaThe Diocesan Seminary in the United States: A History from the 1780s to The Present. By Joseph M. WhiteThe Correspondence of Erasmus: Letters 1252 to 1355. Translated by R. A. B. MynorsCatholics Against the Church: Anti‐Abortion Protest in Toronto, 1969–1985. By Michael W. CuneoThe Return of the English Benedictines to London Ealing Abbey: 1896 to Independence. By René KollarThe Theater of Devtion: East Anglian Drama and Society in ttw Late Middle Ages. By Gail McMurray GibsonMary Tudor: A Life. By David LoadesMany Tables: The Eucharist in the New Testament and Liturgy Today. By Dennis E. Smith and Hal E. Taussig. (shrink)

MEDIEVAL LOGICS LAMBERT MARIE DE RIJK (ed.), Die mittelalterlichen Traktate De mod0 opponendiet respondendi, Einleitung und Ausgabe der einschlagigen Texte. (Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Neue Folge Band 17.) Miinster: Aschendorff, 1980. 379 pp. No price stated. THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY MARTA FATTORI, Lessico del Novum Organum di Francesco Bacone. Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo 1980. Two volumes, il + 543, 520 pp. Lire 65.000. VIVIAN SALMON, The study of language in 17th century England. (Amsterdam Studies in the Theory (...) and History of Linguistic Science, Series 111: Studies in theHistory of Linguistics, Volume 17.) Amsterdam: John Benjamins B.V., 1979.x + 218 pp. Dfl. 65. Theoria cum Praxi. Zum Verhaltnis von Theorie und Praxis im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert. (Akten des 111. Internationalen Leibnizkongress, Hannover, 12. bis 17.November 1977, Band 111: Logik, Erkenntnistheorie, Wissenschaftstheorie, Metaphysik, Theologie.) Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1980. vii + 269 pp. DM 48. CLASSICAL AND NON-CLASSICAL LOGICS MICHAEL CLARK, The place of syllogistic in logical theory. Nottingham: University of Nottingham Press, 1980. ix + 151 pp. £3.00. A.F. PARKER-RHODES, The theory of indistinguishables. Dordrecht, Boston and London: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1981. xvii + 216 pp. Dfl.90.00/$39.50. NICHOLAS RESCHER and ROBERT BRANDOM, The logic of inconsistency. Oxford:Basil Blackwell, 1980. x + 174 pp. f 11.50. MISCELLANEOUS J. ZELENY, The logic of Marx. Translated from the German by T. Carver. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980. xcii + 247 pp. £12.50. FELIX KAUFMANN, The infinite in mathematics. Edited by Brian McGuinness. Introduction by E. Nagel. Translation from the German by Paul Foulkes. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978. xvii + 235 pp. Dfl 85/$39.50 (cloth); Dfl 45/$19.95 (paper). PAMELA MCCORDUCK, Machines who think. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1979. xiv + 275 pp. $14.95. J. MITTELSTRASS (ed.), Enzyklopadie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie Bd. 1 : A-G. Mannheim, Wien, Ziirich: Bibliographisches Institut, 1980. 835 pp. DM 128. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Impartial Spectator: Adam Smith’s Moral PhilosophyJames R. OttesonD. D. Raphael. The Impartial Spectator: Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007. Pp. v + 143. Cloth, $35.00.This is a puzzling and ultimately frustrating book. It is puzzling because, while its author suggests he has made an extensive review of secondary literature (2–5, 43–7, 119), there are in fact many curious omissions, including recent important work (...) that bears directly on the book’s topic. Perhaps Raphael’s low opinion of some economists’ commentary on Smith (1) disinclines him to look at the work of more recent economic historians, some of which is excellent, and of philosophers whose commentary is influenced by that of good economic historians. The book is moreover frustrating because it is not clear what exactly it is supposed to do. Its brevity, its largely jargon-free writing style, and its relatively basic and introductory discussions all suggest that it is meant for lay audiences. Yet in several places it dwells at length on historical minutiae and textual exegeses that could interest only the scholar. For whom, then, is it written?The thesis of the book is that the central contribution of Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) (TMS) is its presentation of a distinctive and still useful notion of an Impartial Spectator standard of moral judgment. A second theme is that TMS underwent substantial, not merely cosmetic, changes between its first publication when Smith was thirty-six and the final, sixth, revision during Smith’s life which appeared shortly before Smith’s death in 1790, when he was sixty-seven years old. Raphael argues that subsequent editions of TMS showed crucial development in particular of the Smithian Impartial Spectator—which, because it is, as Raphael claims, the most important philosophical contribution the book makes, means that this development in Smith’s thought is itself important (11). None of this is particularly new or controversial, although Raphael has a point that some scholars—including, perhaps, myself (though he does not cite me as an example)—have insufficiently appreciated the fact that Smith developed the idea over time. This is a claim that will matter more to scholars than to philosophers, however. Philosophers usually wish to reconstruct the most powerful or charitable version of a historical figure’s argument, and then assess [End Page 326] that for soundness, plausibility, and so on, content to leave it to scholars to worry over the exegetical matters. Raphael seems to want to be both a scholar and a philosopher in this book, but the two are uncomfortable partners here.For example, in chapter 2 Raphael argues that imagination plays at least as important a role in TMS as sympathy does. He writes that “on most occasions imagination is a prerequisite for sympathy” (13) and that “Smith thinks of imagination as more pervasive than feelings of sympathy” (15). This is an intriguing thesis. The ensuing discussion, however, leaves philosophers wondering why imagination is on some occasions but not others a prerequisite for sympathy, and whether a sympathetic approval or disapproval without the use of imagination still counts as a moral judgment at all. Raphael’s discussion provides no help. Moreover, his discussion is not particularly enlightening for the scholar, since the handful of examples he mentions from Smith’s text does not come close to a representative, let alone exhaustive, sampling.When Raphael discusses the Impartial Spectator proper, he says that having edited TMS, as he has, “gives one an eye for spotting earlier and later composition” (33). Much of his historical tracing of the development of Smith’s ideas displays this seasoned eye (esp. chs. 5–6). But Raphael’s treatment is blind to the interesting philosophical questions at stake. What, for example, is the mechanism by which the viewpoint of the Impartial Spectator is created? Raphael writes that “[e]ach of us judges others as a spectator. Each of us finds spectators judging him. We then come to judge our own conduct by imagining whether an impartial spectator would approve or disapprove of it” (35). But why do we do this? How? Is the creation of this perspective identical to adopting... (shrink)

When William James spoke about belief to the philosophy clubs of Yale and Brown in 1896, he forewarned his audience of the nature of his comments by describing them as a “sermon on justification by faith” (James 13), titling the talk “The Will to Believe.” Although there is disagreement about the substance of James’s remarks, it is fairly innocuous to assert that James thought they were appropriate because of the prevalence of the “logical spirit” of many (...) of those who practiced academic philosophy that led them to the conclusion that religious faith was untenable. Aware of his audience, James presents his view on the permissibility of religious faith on the terms and grounds familiar to professional philosophers. .. (shrink)

Philosophy is the work of reason as it seeks to know the truth of what is. Philosophy begins in intuition and ends in argued conclusions. But we can know reality only after its own manner. The inner lives of human beings can only be known by their being told to us, revealed to us. All of reality bears its own fascination if we know how to see it. What life is about is seeing it, then on seeing it, living with (...) it, or perhaps not seeing, to live without what we should have seen. Only individuals who think and who can see relationships between things can be charmed by them. They alone can see in real things intimations of more than they can grasp by themselves. The “enchanted” world was a world in which, everywhere we looked, we found traces, footprints of the divine or at least of story, intelligence, and order. Enchantment and intelligence support each other, both are needed for a knowledge of the whole. (shrink)

Original and penetrating, this book investigates of the notion of inference from signs, which played a central role in ancient philosophical and scientific method. It examines an important chapter in ancient epistemology: the debates about the nature of evidence and of the inferences based on it--or signs and sign-inferences as they were called in antiquity. As the first comprehensive treatment of this topic, it fills an important gap in the histories of science and philosophy.

What has concerned me most is the coherence of political philosophy in the light of what is not political philosophy. Reality, what is, is always richer than our knowledge of it. If we are to understand political things, we have to understand more than political things—things like history, science, literature, practical living, common sense, philosophy itself, and yes, the terms and content of revelation.

Annalisa Coliva (Int J Study Skept 10(3–4):346–366, 2020) asks, “Are there mathematical hinges?” I argue here, against Coliva’s own conclusion, that there are. I further claim that this affirmative answer allows a case to be made for taking the concept of a hinge to be a useful and general-purpose tool for studying mathematical practice in its real complexity. Seeing how Wittgenstein can, and why he would, countenance mathematical hinges additionally gives us a deeper understanding of some of his latest thoughts (...) on mathematics. For example, a view of how mathematical hinges relate to Wittgenstein’s well-known river-bed analogy enables us to see how his way of thinking about mathematics can account nicely for a “dynamics of change” within mathematical research—something his philosophy of mathematics has been accused of missing (e.g., by Robert Ackermann (Wittgenstein’s city, The University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 1988) and Mark Wilson (Wandering significance: an essay on conceptual behavior, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006). Finally, the perspective on mathematical hinges ultimately arrived at will be seen to provide us with illuminating examples of how our conceptual choices and theories can be ungrounded but nevertheless the right ones (in a sense to be explained). (shrink)

The essays in this book all touch on knowledge and its pleasures. Schall does not tarry on the effort and determination it often takes to say just what we want to say, then say it and know that we have said it. Our writing is our thinking, our thinking-through, our being pleased to know this is it... this is the point Schall, one of America's greatest essayists, makes here.

The rejection of a “characterless” moral self is central to some of Bernard Williams’ most important contributions to philosophy. By the time of Truth and Truthfulness, he works instead with a model of the self constituted and stabilized out of more primitive materials through deliberation and in concert with others that takes inspiration from Diderot. Although this view of the self raises some difficult questions, it serves as a useful starting point for thinking about the process of developing an authentic (...) moral point of view in the context of contemporary living. In what follows, I begin to fill out and extend this picture of the self and its related notion of authenticity by exploring some of the “technologies of the self” at play in Rachel Cusk’s recent work (primarily, the Outline trilogy, Coventry, Second Place, and “The Stuntman”) that ask us to rethink the possibility and importance of stability; seek a way of constituting oneself and one’s values outside the confining structures of traditional narrative (focusing instead on a framework that might be provided by the visual arts); and give a different role to the sort of internalized other Williams sees as being at work in the mechanisms of shame. (shrink)

Far from being unwelcome or impossible in a mathematical setting, indeterminacy in various forms can be seen as playing an important role in driving mathematical research forward by providing “sources of newness” in the sense of Hutter and Farías :434–449, 2017). I argue here that mathematical coincidences, phenomena recently under discussion in the philosophy of mathematics, are usefully seen as inducers of indeterminacy and as put to work in guiding mathematical research. I suggest that to call a pair of mathematical (...) facts a coincidence is roughly to suggest that the investigation of connections between these facts isn’t worthwhile. To say of this pair, “That’s no coincidence!” is to suggest just the opposite. I further argue that this perspective on mathematical coincidence, which pays special attention to what mathematical coincidences do, may provide us with a better view of what mathematical coincidences are than extant accounts. I close by reflecting on how understanding mathematical coincidences as generating indeterminacy accords with a conception of mathematical research as ultimately aiming to reduce indeterminacy and complexity to triviality as proposed in Rota Indiscrete thoughts, Birkhäuser, 1997). (shrink)

La philosophie politique est une discipline théorique unique en ce qu'elle présuppose et dépend à la fois de la philosophie spéculative et pratique. Elle ouvre aussi les portes à des questions dont s'occupe la révélation à sa manière - questions sur l'amitié avec Dieu, les limites de la justice, la destinée des individus. Le Christ et Socrate ont été tués dans des cités relativement justes. Ce fait même pose naturellement et nécessairement la question de savoir s'il doit en être ainsi, (...) s'il existe un conflit intérieur entre la philosophie ou la révélation et la cité. La philosophie politique est différente parce qu'elle contient dans les lignes générales de son propre propos des questions d'économie, de politique, de métaphysique, et finalement de révélation. (shrink)

What is real and what is noble, as well as what is deranged and wrong, can often be stated briefly. Nietzsche was famous for his succinct aphorisms and epigrams. Aquinas in one of his responses could manage to state clearly what he held to be true. Ultimately, all of our thought needs to be so refined and concentrated that we can see the point. So these are "brief" essays and they are largely of a philosophical "hue." They touch on things (...) worth thinking about. Indeed, often they consider things we really need to think about if our lives are to make sense. The advantage of a collection of essays is that it is free to talk about many things. It can speak of them in a learned way or in an amused and humorous way. As Chesterton said, there is no necessary conflict between what is true and what is funny. Oftentimes, the greatest things we learn are through laughter, even laughter at ourselves and our own foibles and faults. So these essays are "brief." And they are largely of philosophical import. At first sight, taxing beer may seem to have no serious principle, except perhaps for the brewer and the consumer. But wherever there is reality, we can find something to learn. Each of these essays begins with the proposition "on"--this is a classical form of essay in the English language. Belloc, one the essay's greatest masters, wrote a book simply entitled "ON"--and several other books with that introductory "ON" to begin it. The word has the advantage of focusing our attention on some idea, place, book, person, or reality that we happen to come across and notice, then notice again, then wonder about. (shrink)

Face perception plays a central role in social communication and is, arguably, one of the most sophisticated visual perceptual skills in humans. The organization of neural systems for face perception has stimulated intense debate. This article presents an updated model of distributed human neural systems for face perception. It opens up with a discussion of the Core System for visual analysis of faces with an emphasis on the distinction between perception of invariant features for identity recognition and changeable features for (...) recognition of facial gestures such as expression and eye gaze. The study analyses the roles of systems for the representation of emotion, for person knowledge, and for action understanding in face recognition and perception of expression and gaze. It presents systems that are of particular relevance for social communication and that are illustrative of how distributed systems are engaged by face perception. It concludes with a discussion of modularity and distributed processing in neural representation. (shrink)